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 chapter 20
Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic 
Countries: Do Constitutional Rights Matter?
Trude Haugli and Anna Nylund
1 Introduction
This study demonstrates tangible variations in how children’s rights are pro-
tected in the Nordic Constitutions, even given that the countries, in many ways, 
have similar cultures, traditions and legal systems. Thus, a central undertaking 
for this chapter is to analyse the interlinkages and discrepancies between the 
formal level of protection of children’s rights in the Constitution with the lev-
el of protection in statutory law and court practice. We also analyse whether 
and how constitutional protection is reflected in legislation, court rulings, and 
government policies and practices. A central question is whether constitution-
al protection matters for implementation of children’s rights and whether it 
provides advocacy tools. A key observation is that the protection of children’s 
rights varies within each country:  In some areas of law, children’s rights are 
outlined in detail, in other areas, obvious lacunae remain. Some domains of 
law are more ‘child- including’, others remain ‘adult- centred’. The question is 
whether some domains are more prone or resistant towards acknowledging 
children as agents and right’s holders.
In this chapter, we compare the findings from the contributions in this vol-
ume to attempt to uncover whether and how including children’s rights in the 
Constitution matters.
Firstly, we analyse children’s constitutional rights in general in the Nordic 
countries, building on a typology developed by Conor O’Mahony, which builds 
on children’s rights as envisaged in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(crc).1 The model measures the protection of children’s rights on three spec-
trums: visibility, agency and enforceability. However, since we study the Nordic 
countries in specific, our analyses allow us a more detailed analysis than what 
could be done in his study, analysing 47 European countries. In addition, we 
 1 Conor O’Mahony, ‘Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights: Visibility, Agency and En-
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analyse implementation of children’s rights in general and the interrelation 
between the wording of the Constitution and implementation.
Secondly, we discuss how international instruments work as supplement to 
constitutional law in the Nordic countries. The rationale is to illustrate how 
international instruments supply protection offered by national constitutions 
and how case law from international bodies serves as an impetus for change.
Thirdly, we compare implementation and enforcement of children’s rights 
in each of the three domains included in this volume: the principle of the best 
interests of the child, participatory rights and the right to family life.
Finally, we address the question of whether enshrining children’s rights ex-
plicitly in the constitution really matters.
2 Protection of Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries
2.1 A Spectrum Analysis of Children’s Rights
As mentioned above, this general analysis of protection of children’s consti-
tutional rights in the Nordic countries utilises a typology consisting of three 
indicators – visibility, agency and enforcement – each of which consists of 
a spectrum of classifications developed by Conor O’Mahony.2 His typology 
matches our approach. The multiple dimensions allow a nuanced analysis 
to a far greater extent than binary categories do. The visibility spectrum 
measures the extent to which children’s rights are expressly protected in the 
Constitution. The agency spectrum assesses whether children are consid-
ered independent, autonomous rights- holder or merely objects in need of 
protection. The enforcement spectrum determines the extent to which chil-
dren’s rights are enforceable through a variety of remedies. A Constitution 
 2 Conor O’Mahony (n 1). For other typologies of children’s constitutional rights, see John Tobin, 
‘Increasingly Seen and Heard:  The Constitutional Recognition of Children’s Rights’(2005) 
21 South African Journal on Human Rights 86– 126 and Janette Habashi and others, ‘Con-
stitutional Analysis:  A Proclamation of Children’s Right to Protection, Provision, and Par-
ticipation’ (2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 267– 290. Tobin employs the 
 categories of ‘invisible child’, ‘special protection’ and ‘child rights’ constitutions, which is a 
more rudimentary typology than measuring the spectrums of visibility and agency. Further-
more, although Tobin discusses enforcement by mentioning justiciability, access to justice, 
judicial conservatism and social legitimacy, the aspect of enforcement remains underde-
veloped in his typology. Habashi and others utilise a linguistic content analysis to provide 
quantitative data on the prevalence of protection, provision and participation rights in con-
stitutions of countries with a high, medium and low Human Development Index. This meth-
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might score high on one of the spectrums, but, at the same time, low on 
the other spectrums. O’Mahony’s classification captures the recognition 
that mentioning children in the Constitution does not suffice if children are 
treated as ‘objects’ of protection rather than individuals who can exercise 
agency and when rights are mere symbols without sufficient remedies at-
tached to them.3
In addition to discussing the wording, interpretation and enforcement of 
Nordic Constitutions, this study encompasses implementation of children’s 
constitutional rights in legislation and government practice. Thus, we add the 
component of implementation to the aspects of the analysis.
2.2 Visibility Spectrum of Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordics
O’Mahony applies a four- tier scale for the visibility spectrum of children’s 
rights:  invisible, education, education+ and detailed children’s rights provi-
sions. Despite their cultural, historical, legal and societal similarities, in our 
study, the Nordic countries receive dissimilar ratings on the visibility spectrum.
Norway receives the highest score, since section 104 of the Constitution is 
devoted to children’s rights vesting several different rights with children and 
stressing children’s dignity as a basic legal principle. In addition, section 109 of 
the Constitution on the right to education mentions children explicitly. Den-
mark, on the other hand, lands in the second- lowest category of education, 
since children are only mentioned explicitly in section 76 of the Danish Con-
stitution, which regulates the right to free primary education.
The Finnish Constitution mentions children explicitly and give the right 
to equality and the right to participation in decisions concerning themselves. 
The principle of non- discrimination, freedom, education and social benefits 
are also enshrined in the Constitution, but these sections do not mention 
 children.4
Section 65 of the Icelandic Constitution contains the principles of equality 
and non- discrimination, but the article does not mention children. Section 76, 
subsection 3, however, gives the state the duty to provide children with pro-
tection and care. Subsection 2 enshrines the right to education but does not 
mention children. Thus, children are assigned some visibility. The proposed 
 3 Michael Freeman, ‘Why it remains important to take children’s rights seriously’ (2007) 15 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 5– 23, 8.
 4 Suvianna Hakalehto, ‘Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights in Finland’ in Trude 
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amendments to the Icelandic Constitution would, nevertheless, improve chil-
dren’s agency by giving children the right to be heard.5
The Swedish Constitution only mentions children in  chapter  1, section 2 
of the Instrument of Government (one of the four Constitutional Acts). Chil-
dren’s right to education is also specifically included in the Instrument of Gov-
ernment. Other provisions safeguard non- discrimination and citizenship, but 
do not render visibility to children, as children are not explicitly mentioned.6
The Swedish and Norwegian Constitutions have provisions of a declarato-
ry, symbolic nature that highlight children’s rights. The Swedish Constitution 
mentions children in the general introduction to human rights. Section 104 of 
the Norwegian Constitution acknowledges specifically the human dignity of 
children as a rationale for why children’s rights must be taken seriously. Sig-
urdsen argues that vesting children with crucial rights is a prerequisite for rec-
ognising and honouring their human dignity.7 The declaratory nature of the 
Swedish provision lessens, however, its value as a legal tool with a clear poten-
tial to create a shift in the recognition and enforcement of children’s rights.
The Finnish, Icelandic and Swedish Constitutions fall somewhere between 
the second highest and the highest category, with provisions explicitly men-
tioning children’s rights, albeit not in a section dedicated to children, in addi-
tion to provisions on education where children are either the implicit primary 
beneficiary or the outspoken holders of the right. Pigeon- holing the Nordic 
Constitutions is difficult. Although the Finnish, Icelandic and Swedish Consti-
tutions assign particular rights to children, their provisions render less visibil-
ity both in terms of structure and the rights recognised explicitly as children’s 
rights, than the Norwegian Constitution does. This is in accordance with O’Ma-
hony’s rating of Norway at the highest level of the visibility spectrum, Finland 
and Iceland at the second highest level and Denmark at the third level.8
Naturally, all constitutional rights apply to everyone, also children, but as 
many of the authors note, the focus has traditionally been on adults’ rights and 
an adult perspective on rights. For instance, mandatory measures in child wel-
fare have been considered primarily a possible infringement of parents’ rights 
 5 Hrefna Friðriksdóttir, ‘Protection of Children’s Rights in the Icelandic Constitution’ in 
Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 
2019)  chapter 5, section 5.
 6 Titti Mattsson, ‘Constitutional Rights for Children in Sweden’ in Trude Haugli and others 
(eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 6, section 3.
 7 Randi Sigurdsen, ‘Children’s Right to Respect for their Human Dignity’ in Trude Haugli and 
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rather than children’s rights in Danish law.9 However, children are increasingly 
seen as autonomous holders of rights across the Nordic countries, particularly 
in certain areas, such as child welfare law.
The age of the Constitution and the timing of the reform cycle seems to be 
the primary explanation for these differences. Though the Norwegian Consti-
tution was formally enacted in 1814, the Bill of Rights was completely over-
hauled in the 2010s. The Finnish Constitution reflects state- of- the- art of the 
1990s, and the Danish Constitution the legal thinking of the early post- war 
years with mainly classic liberty rights, many of which are not specifically rel-
evant for children. The Finnish and Icelandic Constitutions enshrine rights for 
children in specific contexts related to non- discrimination and social rights. 
The Swedish Constitution has only educational rights, in addition to a declar-
atory provision mentioning children’s rights. Since the Swedish constitutional 
acts were partly amended in the early 2000s, this age- explanation is not accu-
rate for all countries. Nonetheless, it explains the differences among the Nordic 
countries, in general.
Another explanation is the stance towards constitutional reforms. Danes ap-
pear to consider their Constitution to a larger extent than their Nordic neigh-
bours to be a static document that the legislator should not ‘meddle’ with it by 
amending it.10 In contrast, the Icelandic Constitution appears to be amenable 
to periodic review.11
A third aspect consists of constitutional interpretation, in particular, the in-
terpretation of vague provisions. The Finnish and Icelandic Constitutions have 
vague, open- ended provisions on children’s rights. According to Friðriksdóttir, 
it is ‘widely recognised that the written text of the Constitution does not ful-
ly represent the extent and depth of constitutional law’.12 Therefore, section 
76 of the Icelandic Constitution could – and should – be interpreted broadly 
to encompass participatory rights, either because it is presumed to reflect the 
crc or as a result of dynamic interpretation, as Gísladóttir.13 Finland, in con-
trast, has a tradition for literal interpretation. Consequently, the wording of the 
 9 Caroline Adolphsen, ‘Constitutional Rights for Danish Children’ in Trude Haugli and oth-
ers (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 7, sec-
tions 2 and 4.2.1.
 10 Adolphsen, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 9) sections 1 and 2.
 11 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) sections 2.1 and 5..
 12 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 2.3.
 13 Elisabet Gísladóttir, ‘Children’s Right to Participation in Iceland’ in Trude Haugli and oth-












Trude Haugli and Anna Nylund - 9789004382817
Downloaded from Brill.com02/24/2020 02:03:43PM
via University of Tromso
396 Haugli and Nylund
Constitution alone may not be decisive for establishing the level of constitu-
tional protection.
Interestingly, only a small range of children’s rights are explicitly included in 
the Nordic Constitutions. Protection from economic exploitation, child labour, 
harm and sexual abuse are not explicitly included in any of the Nordic Consti-
tutions. Specific rights for children representing ethnic, religious, and sexual 
minorities, and children with disabilities are not explicitly included in any of 
the Constitutions, unlike several other European Constitutions.14 The reason 
could be that children are considered included regardless of whether they are 
explicitly mentioned or not. Thus, mentioning children explicitly could be 
considered redundant. This appears to be in harmony with the prevailing Nor-
dic ideology of equality, where mentioning one group would be at odds with 
egalitarianism.15 Swedish constitutional law reflects this view because it seems 
to expect that a general declaration that children are equal suffices to ensure 
equal rights.16 Another explanation is the perceived absence of child labour 
and gross exploitation of children in the Nordic countries. Hence, there would 
be no direct need to include these issues in the Constitution, because crimi-
nalisation of such acts would suffice.17 Furthermore, one could argue that the 
protection of the right to respect for dignity and integrity encompasses these 
aspects, as well.
The inherent weakness of the Nordic approach is that a narrow catalogue of 
rights may result in children having rights in some areas of law, but not in oth-
ers. As Sigurdsen emphasises, dignity is entangled with equality and autono-
my; dignity is honoured when we respect children’s autonomy and capabilities 
rather by giving them rights than accentuating their vulnerability and need for 
protection.18 Furthermore, the approach may both reflect and result in adult 
decision- makers overlooking or disregarding the specific problems disabled 
and minority children face as a combination of being simultaneously part of at 
least two vulnerable groups.19 Exploitation of children may fall under the radar 
because it takes a different, less visible form in highly developed societies, such 
 14 O’Mahony (n 1).
 15 Anna Nylund, ‘Introduction’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional 
Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 1, section 2.1.
 16 Mattsson (n 6) section 4.
 17 Trude Haugli, ‘Constitutional Rights for Children in Norway’ in Trude Haugli and others 
(eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 3, sec-
tions 3.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
 18 Sigurdsen (n 7) sections 4 and 6.
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as the Nordic countries, than it does in less developed, less affluent places.20 
The question is whether the result is that children are not afforded adequate 
constitutional protection against exploitation. Failing to provide specific pro-
tection of violence against children may result from lack of recognition of the 
particular vulnerability of children vis- à- vis their parents and other caretakers.
Enumerating a right in the Constitution serves as a tool for advocacy and a 
beacon guiding implementation and for developing policies. For instance, in 
the case of protecting children from abuse, penalisation of child abuse does 
not suffice; protection requires other measures as well, such as preventive 
measures offered by health care professional and social services, and equip-
ping police investigators with sufficient resources. Provisions recognising the 
specific vulnerabilities of children and particular groups of vulnerable chil-
dren (e.g. disabled and minority children) are likely to be more powerful tools 
than general provisions on children’s rights or on equality.
2.3 Agency Spectrum of Children’s Constitutional Rights
Agency is a measure of the extent to which children are treated as autono-
mous, independent rights- holders rather than objects in need of protection. 
O’Mahony applies a four- tier typology here, too: paternalistic, predominant-
ly paternalistic, predominantly child- centred and child- centred.21 The Nordic 
Constitutions assign agency to children to various degrees. The Danish Consti-
tution only assigns children the right to primary education, which leaves little 
room for agency.
The only provision in the Icelandic Constitution devoted to children does 
not convey agency. It only obliges the state to protect children and provide 
care. The question is whether it is merely an expression of a social policy goal 
or whether and to which extent it entails rights.22 The Icelandic Constitution 
could be characterised as primarily paternalistic.
The Finnish Constitution contains a general duty to treat children equally 
and with respect, which is an expression of a child- centric mentality. Addition-
ally, children are given the right to be heard, which clearly assigns children a 
right and thus agency.23 The Finnish Constitution underlines agency since the 
 20 See eg the recent report on trafficking in children and juveniles in Finland uncovered 
more extensive problems than expected and how authorities often do not recognise traf-
ficking. See Elina Kervinen and Natalia Ollus, Lapsiin ja nuoriin kohdistuva ihmiskauppa 
Suomessa (European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control 2019). Affiliated with 
the United Nations (heuni) Publication Series No. 89.
 21 O’Mahony (n 1).
 22 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 4.
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single right vested with children is participation. Hence, the Finnish Constitu-
tion could be classified as predominantly child- centred.
Chapter 1, section 2 of the Swedish Instrument of Government obliges pub-
lic organs and institutions to safeguard children’s rights. In doing so, the provi-
sion recognises explicitly that children have rights, although it does not specify 
these rights.24 Hence, the provisions assign children agency and could be la-
belled (primarily) child- centred.
The Norwegian Constitution scores highest on agency, since it explicitly 
bestows children the right to participation.25 The right to respect for human 
dignity assigns agency in the sense that it requires adults to enhance children’s 
capacities, which in turn requires agency.26 The duty to provide for social and 
economic rights is framed as an obligation for the state to protect children 
rather than providing children agency. Consequently, the Norwegian Constitu-
tion scores highly on agency.
The Nordic Constitutions vary considerably in the degree to which agency is 
assigned to children, from no explicit mention of children to a powerful state-
ment recognising children as autonomous, independent persons. The level of 
agency reflects primarily the age of the Constitution and its provisions and fol-
lows the same pattern as visibility. However, the Swedish constitution receives 
a higher score on agency than on visibility.
2.4 Enforceability of Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic  
Countries
The enforceability spectrum of children’s constitutional rights measures 
whether and how children’s rights are enforceable through a variety of reme-
dial avenues. Are rights unenforceable or enforceable through administrative, 
weak judicial or strong judicial remedies? Unless children are able to obtain a 
timely and just remedy, their rights are reduced to ‘mere symbols that miss out 
on much of the added value that constitutional status can bring’, O’Mahony 
asserts, referring to Freeman.27
The Nordic Constitutions enshrine rights that are at least prima facie en-
forceable, such as the rights to participate in decision- making, education, 
physical freedom, and private and family life.28 However, some of them also in-
clude rights of a more declaratory nature, as discussed above. The introductory 
 24 Mattsson (n 6) section 3.
 25 Haugli (n 17) section 4.2.
 26 For a more detailed discussion on the implications of human dignity, see Sigurdsen (n 7).
 27 O’Mahony (n 1).
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chapter in the Swedish Instrument of Government includes a reference to 
children, but the reference has a mere symbolic character.29 The question is 
whether the same applies to the duty to guarantee children care and provision 
in the Icelandic constitution.30 Furthermore, the right to equal treatment in 
the Finnish Constitution appears to be of a declaratory character. The right to 
non- discrimination and the right to respect of human dignity fall somewhere 
in- between justiciable and expression of a general principle.31 Particularly, the 
latter is likely to be non- justiciable, unless it is combined with other rights. As 
an expression of a general principle these kinds of provisions—in particular, 
the Norwegian provision accentuating the human dignity of children—have 
the potential of becoming a strong tool for advocacy of children’s rights; espe-
cially, rights that do not assigned agency to children explicitly.
However, the question is whether children are able to invoke their rights in 
practice. The constitutional practice of limited judicial review could pose a 
hindrance to enforcing children’s rights. Apart from Norwegian courts, Nordic 
courts have been hesitant in exercising their powers and have limited open 
judicial review to instances where legislation is clearly and manifestly contrary 
to constitutional law. However, this restrained approach to judicial review is 
attributable to differences in the role of courts as guardians of the Constitution 
and human rights, rather than protection of children’s rights.32
Interestingly, the willingness of courts to use the Constitution actively in 
their argumentation varies within the countries studied. The differences are 
most tangible in Finland, which has both general and administrative courts. 
The Supreme Administrative Court seems to be more willing to refer to the 
Constitution when ruling on children’s rights.33 What could explain the dif-
ferences among the Finnish Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court? One answer could be differences in legal constellations in these cas-
es. Administrative courts adjudicate cases where the government infringes on 
individual rights, whereas general courts adjudicate matters between private 
individuals. Perhaps the threshold to protect children’s constitutional rights 
vis- à- vis the state is lower than forcefully applying children’s rights when the 
 29 Mattsson (n 6) section 3.
 30 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 4.
 31 Sigurdsen (n 7) section 5.
 32 Nylund, ‘Introduction’ (n 15) section 2.2.
 33 Hakalehto (n 4)  section 2.2; Hannele Tolonen, Sanna Koulu and Suvianna Hakalehto, 
‘Best Interests of the Child in Finnish Legislation and Doctrine: What Has Changed and 
What Remains the Same?’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional 
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counterpart is an adult care- taker. A further question is whether the same dif-
ference exists in Sweden, which also has a two- tier court structure with general 
and administrative courts. Similarly, courts appear to be prone to resort to the 
Constitution in their argumentation in some areas of law, but not in others, 
following at least partly the distinction between private law and public law.
Legal standing influences enforceability. Giving children, rather than their 
guardian, legal standing improves enforceability, since the absence of indepen-
dent legal standing is likely to inhibit children from invoking their rights.34 In the 
Nordic countries, guardians have legal standing on behalf of their children until 
the children reach the age of maturity. Parents are assumed to make decisions 
that are in the best interests of the child.35 In child welfare cases, the conflicts of 
interests between the child and parents are immanent and palpable. Thus, chil-
dren are given independent rights earlier than in most other cases. In contrast, in 
cases on parental responsibility, children are in practice prevented from invoking 
their rights even if there could be significant conflicts of interests between the 
child and the parents. The lack of recognition of the manifold situations where 
the child’s interests and rights are in dissonance with parents’ interests and rights 
impedes children from enforcing their rights.36
Furthermore, much of the decision- making involving children’s rights takes 
place in municipal organs. Consequently, the road to courts is oftentimes long 
and winding. In the majority of cases, the question of enforcement is therefore a 
matter of whether teachers, social workers, nurses and other civil servants value 
children’s rights and implement children’s rights in their daily activities. The de-
sign of administrative complaints is decisive for enforcement of children’s rights.
Finally, ombudsmen are key actors in enforcing children’s rights in the Nor-
dic countries. Parliamentary Ombudsmen have a paramount role in all Nordic 
countries in handling individual complaints against state organs. The Parlia-
mentary Ombudsmen also hear complaints filed by children. The ombudsmen 
do not have the power to overturn or remand administrative decisions, howev-
er, their reproofs are taken seriously and are often consequential.
All Nordic Countries, except for Denmark, have ombudsmen for chil-
dren. None of the ombudsmen has the authority to handle individual com-
plaints from children.37 Denmark has, however, a Children’s Office38 at the 
 34 Adolphsen, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 9) section 3.
 35 Sigurdsen (n 7) section 6.
 36 For a discussion of this topic, see sections 5.1 and 5.2 below.
 37 See Friðriksdóttir (n 5)  section 2.3; Hakalehto (n 4)  sections 2.2, 3.3 and 5.2; Haugli 
(n 17)  section 7; and Barnombudsmannen in Sweden www.barnombudsmannen.se 
(accessed 29 April 2019).
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Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Office and also a Children’s Council.39 The ad-
vantage of the Danish system, where children have a dedicated unit under the 
auspices of the Parliamentary Ombudsman rather than a separate unit, is that 
the children’s unit has the power to hear individual complaints and is, hence, a 
more efficient mechanism. In its Concluding observations on the Nordic coun-
tries, except Denmark, the Committee on the Rights of the Child reiterates its 
recommendation to consider giving the ombudsmen such competence and 
ensure that this mechanism is effective and accessible to all children.40
2.5 Implementation of Children’s Constitutional Rights
Assessing implementation of children’s constitutional rights in the Nordic 
countries is arduous for several reasons. One reason is that the Nordic coun-
tries, as many other countries, recognise children’s rights in general terms, if 
not overtly as a legal principle. Attributing the existence of children’s rights 
to constitutional law is consequently not easy. Furthermore, variations in 
children’s rights among the Nordic countries at the legislative, policy and 
practice levels are fairly small. Another question is whether one should limit 
the study to provisions explicitly mentioning children or to rights enshrined 
in the respective Constitution in general. A further question is whether im-
plementation should be assessed individually for each country or whether 
one should compare children’s rights within specific areas of law across the 
Nordic countries. Moreover, the chapters discussing children’s constitutional 
rights in general in in this volume ( chapters 3– 7) have a limited scope. Fur-
ther, the areas studied reflect the scope of constitutional protection of chil-
dren’s rights, current debates and topics in each country and perhaps also 
the research interests of each author. They are thus not amenable to direct 
comparison.
Nevertheless, there are indications that visibility in the Constitution trans-
lates into implementation in legislation, court practice and policies.
The findings on the Norwegian Constitution illustrates the potential sym-
bolic value of a specific section on children’s rights as a primary source of law 
and guideline for lawmakers and policymakers. In contrast to the Icelandic 
Constitution, the Norwegian preparatory works give ample guidance on why 
 39 https:// www.boerneraadet.dk/ (accessed 29 April 2019).
 40 Concluding observations of the crc Committee on consideration of reports submitted 
by State parties under Article 44 of the Convention. Norway CRC/ C/ NOR/ CO/ 5– 6 (1 June 
2018) chapter A, para 8; Sweden CRC/ C/ SWE/ CO/ 5 (6 March 2015) chapter A para 14; 
Iceland CRC/ C/ ISL/ CO/ 3– 4 (23 January 2012) chapter iv, para 17; Finland CRC/ C/ FIN/ 
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specific rights were included, and the section 104 subsection 1 emphasising hu-
man dignity of children imposes a general duty to respect children as auton-
omous rights- holders. Although the duty to facilitate children’s development 
is of a declaratory nature, economic and social rights are justiciable according 
to the preparatory works.41 Considering the paramount role of preparatory 
works in Norway, and the Nordic countries in general,42 these comments re-
move many of the potential ambiguities associated with economic and social 
rights. In spite of a specific provision in the Constitution, children’s rights are 
still sometimes overlooked in the legislative process,43 and there are numerous 
examples of policies and practices that are contrary to the wording and spir-
it of section 104.44 The impact on court rulings is unclear, because although 
Norwegian courts refer to section 104, they have so far refrained from inter-
preting it independently and from explaining whether and how it influences 
the outcome, notes Haugli.45 However, since section 104 is relatively new, our 
conclusions are only provisional. To the extent that children’s rights are well 
protected in Norway, much of the work that caused this pre- dates section 104 
and may stem from a child- centric turn in general rather than from constitu-
tionalisation of children’s rights.
In Finland, children’s constitutional rights are employed as an argument in 
the legislative process . Hakalehto notes a shift in the use of children’s rights 
as a key argument and explicit references to both section 6 of the Constitu-
tion and relevant provisions in the crc in preparatory works.46 The chang-
es have been gradual and is probably linked to the increasing role of human 
rights in general. As Hakalehto notes, embedding children’s rights in statutory 
law is imperative since practitioners rely primarily on statutory law, not the 
Constitution, when they develop and monitor practices. For rights that are 
 41 Haugli (n 17) section 4.6.
 42 Nylund, ‘Introduction’ (n 15) section 2.1.
 43 Haugli (n 17) section 7.
 44 For examples, see Lena R L Bendiksen, ‘Children’s Constitutional Right to Respect for 
Family Life in Norway: Words or Real Effect?’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s 
Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)   chapter  16, section 6; Anna 
Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate in Decision- Making in Norway: Paternalism and 
Autonomy’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic 
Countries (Brill 2019)   chapter  11, sections 5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3; Kirsten Sandberg, ‘Best 
Interests of the Child in the Norwegian Constitution’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), 
Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 8, sections 3.2 
and 5.2.
 45 Haugli (n 17) section 7.
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not explicitly recognised in the Constitution, implementation in statutory law 
both directly and through preparatory works is vital.47
The limited context in which children are explicitly enshrined in the Icelandic 
Constitution and the brief discussions in the preparatory works hinder a broader 
analysis of children’s rights and may lead to the false conclusion that both chil-
dren’s rights and economic and social rights are policy statements rather than 
rights and that they are only weakly enforceable. Furthermore, ‘protection and 
care’ is ambiguous: it could be interpreted narrowly or broadly, and even inter-
preted to encompass participatory rights. As Friðriksdóttir explains, Icelandic 
courts have been hesitant to add to the analysis of the provision.48
Despite the fact that children’s rights are protected only in a declaratory pro-
vision in the Swedish Instrument of Government and that it is hence not justi-
ciable and does not entail any specific rights, children’s rights are increasingly 
recognised and implemented in Swedish legislation and legal practices. How-
ever, the child- centric turn emanates more from general shifts in the view of 
children and from international instruments such as the crc, European Court 
of Human Rights (echr) and EU instruments, explains Mattsson. In her opin-
ion, the forthcoming implementation of the crc ought to result in a review of 
Swedish law, both on the constitutional level and the level of statutory law.49
Although the Danish Constitution does not mention children specifically, 
it nevertheless endows children’s rights. Children have a constitutional right 
to physical integrity; hence, it must be respected. In this respect, Denmark is 
similar to the other Nordic countries. Nonetheless, the protection is weaker 
because the Constitution does not mandate treating children as autonomous 
rights holders. This, in turn, influences arguments available in a discussion on 
inter alia appropriate age- limits for assigning children autonomy, and whether 
age- limits should be combined with individual assessments on the maturity of 
the child, notes Adolphsen.50
The contributions in this volume hint at a specific problem in implementing 
children’s rights: providing equal rights for all children. Friðriksdóttir discusses 
how children in rural areas may be deprived of social services and special ed-
ucation due to the fact that access to services is more limited in these places 
than in urban areas and how the needs of particularly vulnerable children, for 
instance, disabled children, may be disregarded.51 Hakalehto notes how the 
 47 Hakalehto (n 4) section 7.
 48 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 4.
 49 Mattsson (n 6) section 6.
 50 Adolphsen, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 9) section 4.2.
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fact that the right to early childhood education is limited to 20 hours a week 
unless both parents work full- time, amounts to discrimination of children 
based on their needs.
Based on the perspectives and examples in the five contributions on chil-
dren’s constitutional rights in general, the visibility, agency and enforceabili-
ty of children’s rights at the constitutional level has at least some impact on 
implementation of those rights. The Constitutions provide powerful tools for 
advocacy, both in terms of general principles mandating the government and 
government officials at all levels to treat children as autonomous subjects and 
by specifying rights. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Norwegian 
Constitution appears to offer the best tools for implementing children’s rights. 
Even so, implementation is slow and sometimes cumbersome or unsuccessful.
One important caveat remains in our study. All contributions in this volume 
discuss children’s rights in general. Consequently, issues related to children in 
particularly vulnerable situations are mentioned haphazardly, but the issues 
are not explored in- depth. The contributions indicate that such children are 
at risk of having deprived of their rights in practice. A few authors mention 
children in immigration cases and how these children are given less voice than 
children in child welfare and parental responsibility cases. Disabled and seri-
ously ill children receive only limited attention as do minority children. Our 
study is an initial study that lays ground for further exploration of specific chil-
dren’s rights in specific contexts. Vulnerable children and their rights are an 
area calling for more research.
3 International Instruments as Supplements to Constitutional Law
In all the Nordic countries children’s rights are also protected through interna-
tional instruments, many of which have a semi- constitutional character.
The Fundamental Rights Charter of the European Union is directly appli-
cable in Denmark, Finland and Sweden in the power of their EU membership. 
The efta Court has repeatedly stated that although the Charter is not  formally 
European Free Trade Association (efta) law, the rights enshrined in it are 
 applicable as general principles of efta law.52
The echr and the crc have a semi- constitutional character in Finnish and 
Norwegian law since the Constitution obliges government organs to ensure 
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human rights, which includes all ratified human right’s treaties. Finnish and 
Norwegian courts tend to interpret their Constitutions in the light of the 
echr.53 The Norwegian Human Rights Act explicitly gives the echr and crc 
a semi- constitutional character. Their rank is below the Constitution but above 
other statutory law. The echr has a similar status in Swedish law, however, the 
crc has not been incorporated into Swedish law yet, but from 2020 onwards 
it will.54 In Finland and Iceland, the echr and the crc have the same status 
as other acts of parliament.55 In Denmark, only the echr is incorporated into 
Danish law, while Denmark has only ratified the crc. Danish courts are reluc-
tant to use international instruments in their argumentation.56 As explained 
in the introductory chapter, the disinclination of Danish courts to use the crc 
and other international instruments, stems from a tradition of emphasising 
sovereignty in combination with a restrained approach to judicial review.57
The extent to which children’s rights are enshrined under the panoply of 
international instrument varies to some extent among the Nordic countries, 
particularly, as to the crc and to the extent to which the legislature explicitly 
bases their argumentation on these instruments and the courts are willing to 
enforce the rights enshrined and to interpret national legislation in light of in-
ternational instruments. Based on the contributions in this volume, European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law comes across as having particularly 
strong persuasive force in Finland. One reason may be that Finnish courts had 
no right to perform judicial review until the echr was ratified and implement-
ed in Finnish law in the mid- 1990s.58
However, as for constitutional protection of children’s rights, differences 
seem to derive mainly from the general approach to human rights and inter-
national law rather than children’s rights, in particular. The echr and the EU 
Charter may be considered to have a higher status than the crc due to the high 
status of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu). 
For instance, the majority in a plenary judgement of the Norwegian Supreme 
Court refused to assign significant weight to the general comments from the 
crc Committee.59
 53 Hakalehto (n 4) section 2; Haugli (n 17) sections 2 and 3.3, Tolonen et al. (n 33) sections 
3.1 and 3.2.
 54 Mattsson (n 6) sections 2.3, 2.4. and 4.
 55 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 2.2.
 56 Adolphsen, ‘Constitutional Rights’ (n 9) section 1.2.
 57 Nylund, ‘Introduction’ (n 15) section 2.2.
 58 Nylund, ‘Introduction’ (n 15) section 2.2.
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4 The Best Interests of the Child
The implementation of the principle of the right of the child to have his or 
her best interests taken as a primary consideration differs between the Nordic 
countries and also within different domains within each country. This anal-
ysis is based on Norwegian, Finish and Swedish law. The principle has been 
well known and applied in practise for several decades, especially in family 
law, child protection and adoption law. Regarding the formal status, only the 
Norwegian Constitution explicitly recognises this principle. Because the best 
interest of the child is one of the general principles of the crc, the variation 
in the status of the crc (Norway and Finland – semi constitutional character, 
Iceland – incorporated, status as national law, Sweden – partly incorporated, 
will become national law in 2020; Denmark – only ratified, not incorporated) 
may also influence the status of the principle in national law.
All the Nordic countries have statutory provisions in different areas of law 
where the principle is stated, primarily in the field of family law, child protec-
tion, adoption and immigration. In Norway and Sweden, the principle is in 
addition stated in a wide range of areas of law, for example, in health law, ed-
ucation law, and even in criminal law. In Finland, the best interests- principles 
is stated in the Act on Early Childhood Education and Care, but not in the Ba-
sic Education Act. Although the principle is seemingly coherent, as Schiratzki 
notes, the principle may presumably be given divergent interpretations in the 
various field of law.60 A common observation is that the more politically load-
ed an area is, with immigration law as the paramount example, the weaker the 
position of the principle is, both in legislative work and in individual cases.61 
Court cases are considerably influenced by crc and case law from the ECtHR. 
Further, one could argue that a ‘constitutionalisation‘ of the concept is taking 
place both in Sweden and Finland.62
An interesting issue before Norwegian courts has been whether crc article 
3 is justiciable in and of itself, without being connected to other claims. This is 
discussed by Sandberg, who notes that the new section 104 of the Norwegian 
Constitution may shed new light on this issue, after the Supreme Court in 2012 
decided that article 3 is not justiciable.63
 60 Johanna Schiratzki, ‘The Elusive Best Interest of the Child and the Swedish Constitution’ 
in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries 
(Brill 2019)  chapter 10, section 4.
 61 Sandberg (n 44) section 4.
 62 Tolonen, Koulu and Hakalehto (n 33) section 4; and Schiratzki, ‘The Elusive Best Interests’ 
(n 60) section 4.
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In this volume, the authors mainly focus on the best interests of the child 
in case law and in preparation of legislation. However, the best interests- 
principle has a much wider scope. For all the Nordic countries, one may see 
from the concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
referring to its general comment No 14 (2013), that it recommends in slightly 
differing wording that states
– strengthen their efforts to establish clear criteria regarding the best interests 
of the child for all those authorities that have to take decisions affecting 
children;
– provide sufficient training for relevant professionals on best interests- 
determinations, and
– ensure that this right is appropriately integrated and consistently interpret-
ed and applied in all legislative, administrative and judicial proceedings and 
decisions as well as in all policies, programmes, projects and international 
cooperation relevant to and having an impact on children.64
Constitutionally protected or not, it seems like all the Nordic countries still 
have a long way to go in order to fulfil the requirements of the crc committee 
on how to really take the best interests- principle into account.
5 The Right to Participation in Decision- Making
5.1 Defining Participatory Rights
All Nordic countries recognise children’s right to participation, although only 
the Finnish and Norwegian Constitutions provide explicitly protection. Rules 
providing for participation emerged already decades ago, far earlier than the 
constitutional right.
A question raised in all five chapters on participatory rights is what par-
ticipation entails. Is it a question of hearing children to gain information to 
improve the quality of the decisions that adults make on behalf of children? Is 
it a matter of giving children voice to enable child- focused or child- friendly de-
cisions? Or, does it entail a duty to let children participate directly or through 
a representative and to let them form the decision- making process, the agenda 
and the outcomes? Is it primarily a question of hearing the child – a procedural 
 64 Concluding observations of the crc Committee on consideration of reports submitted by 
State parties under Article 44 of the Convention. Norway (n 40) Part B para 13; Sweden 
(n 40) Part B paras 17– 18; Iceland (n 40) Part iv paras 26 and 27; Finland (n 40) Part B 
paras 27– 28. The topic is not mentioned in the concluding observation to the Danish 
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matter or also an obligation to give children influence on the outcome – a sub-
stantive matter in addition to a procedural matter? When children are assigned 
a representative, should the representative primarily advocate the views of the 
child, the individual perspective of the child concerned, or the child’s best in-
terests, a child perspective but not so much from the point of view of the spe-
cific child concerned?65 Although the crc and the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child clearly support to the broadest notion of participation and focusing 
on each child’s individual views,66 on a national level the issue still appears to 
be unclear.
Despite progress, the belief that participation is harmful for children is still 
common, as is the belief that younger children (i.e. children age 8– 9 or young-
er) are too immature to participate.67 Current practices and processes are sel-
dom designed to enable meaningful participation and the views of the child 
are construed narrowly, which presupposes fairly advanced cognitive and ver-
bal capabilities. Additionally, exceptions for children’s participation are some-
times interpreted quite broadly, such as in the Finnish Aliens Act which makes 
an exception for situations when hearing the child is manifestly unnecessary. 
The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court, however, ruled that the exception 
must be interpreted narrowly.68
Furthermore, parents are generally considered to have the power to make 
decisions on behalf of their children and have the primary obligation to hear 
the child69:  authorities have traditionally entrusted hearing the child to the 
 65 Pernilla Leviner, ‘Voice but no Choice – Children’s Right to Participation in Sweden’ in 
Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 
2019)  chapter 14, section 3.2.1; Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) section 2.
 66 General comment no. 20 (2016) on the implementation of the rights of the child during ado-
lescence (6 December 2016)  CRC/ C/ GC/ 20 paras 7– 8; General comment no.  12 (2009) 
The Right of the child to be heard (20 July 2009) CRC/ C/ GC/ 12; General comment No. 7 
(2005) Implementing child rights in early childhood (20 September 2006) CRC/ C/ GC/ 7/ 
Rev.1 paras 6– 7; General comment no. 4 (2003) Adolescent health and development in the 
context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1 July 2003) CRC/ GC/ 2003/ 4 paras 
7, 9– 10.
 67 Gísladóttir (n 13)  sections 5.3– 5.4; Tolonen, ‘Children’s Right to Participate and Their 
Developing Role in Finnish Proceedings’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s 
Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 12, section 2.
 68 Tolonen (n 67) section 2.3. Gísladóttir (n 13) section 5.4, mentions a comparable exam-
ple where the Icelandic Supreme Court overruled a ruling where a 10- year- old had not 
been heard in a case concerning residence and contact.
 69 Gísladóttir (n 13)  section 4; Hanne Hartoft, ‘Children’s Right to Participation in 
Denmark:  What is the Difference Between Hearing, Co- Determination and Self- 
Determination? in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the 
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parents and trusted that the parents’ give a sufficient and exact account of 
the child’s views. Authorities do not control whether and how parents have 
involved their child in decision- making. Moreover, these methods of partici-
pation disregard potential conflicts of interests between the parents and the 
child, and that, in some situations, children have a legitimate wish of privacy 
from their parents. Consequently, these practices are not compatible with the 
spirit of the crc as expressed in the general comments,70 since they deprive 
children of effective participation and hinder children from receiving informa-
tion directly.
There are signs of change, such as reforms giving children the right to act 
without involvement of their parents in health care settings and even to keep 
information secret from their parents.71 Another example is the Danish family- 
law house where children have an independent right to schedule a meeting at 
the house to discuss custody, residence and contact arrangements.72
5.2 Participatory Rights – Voice and Choice
Children’s right to participation varies across different domains. Children have 
very limited opportunities to collective, civic participation and active citizen-
ship in the Nordic countries. Although extending voting rights to 16- and 17- 
year- olds has been discussed, the arguments of the opponents, mainly that 
children are immature and inexperienced, have  – at least until now  – pre-
vailed.73 Leviner remarks how children are automatically considered to lack 
the capacity and competence to assess information and make ‘rational’ choic-
es in elections, and that the capacity will magically surface at the moment they 
turn 18.74 The youth demonstrations for climate are a direct consequence of 
the disenfranchisement of children: since children are barred from participat-
ing in political processes, they must avail themselves of other opportunities for 
making their voices heard.
Youth councils and school councils are the exceptions to lack of participa-
tion at the collective level. Nonetheless, since the decision- making authori-
ty of these organs is very limited, in the case of youth councils sometimes 
even virtually non- existent, these organs pay, in effect, lip service to children’s 
 70 Gísladóttir (n 13) sections 5.3– 5.4; Tolonen (n 67) section 2.
 71 See Gísladóttir (n 13)  section 4; Hartoft (n 69)  section 7; Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to 
Participate’ (n 44) section 5.3; Tolonen (n 67) section 2.3.
 72 Hartoft (n 69) section 5.
 73 Gísladóttir (n 13) section 3.3; Leviner (n 65) section 2.1.
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participatory rights.75 Denmark and Norway serve as examples: the youngest 
children in primary schools are excluded from participation in the student 
council and have therefore a limited say on how the physical and social school 
environment is shaped.76 This is true even though one would expect most 
children age 6– 10 be far more interested in, for example, the design of the 
playground, than children age 11– 13 would be. Although town planning has 
significant impact on children’s lives, in particular, for making public spaces 
appealing and accessible and for enabling children to move independently 
in their surroundings, children are not regularly given an opportunity to par-
ticipate in decision- making processes or even rendered an opportunity to be 
heard. Consequently, children’s opportunities to advocate for their views and 
to invoke their rights is limited. This is also an example of the principle of 
‘integration through separation’ of children and young people, where partic-
ipation is confined to a narrow area that serves primarily children and young 
people.77
On the level of decision- making concerning individual children or siblings, 
the view of children’s participatory rights is in a process of transformation. 
Children’s participation is increasingly enshrined, not just in a tokenistic per-
spective as a source of information, but also as an intrinsic value. Progress is, 
nonetheless, fairly slow and proceeds unevenly across different domains. Par-
ticipation in child welfare services has been improved significantly; nonethe-
less, problematic regulation and practices are still abundant. For instance, in 
Sweden, hearing the child regardless of whether the parents cooperate is still 
considered an exception designed only for serious cases.78
In cases on parental responsibility, which belong to the core domain of pri-
vate life, participation rights for children are still limited. In particular, chil-
dren lack legal standing in courts. However, courts increasingly hear children 
either directly during or before the main hearing or request social services or 
 75 See Gísladóttir (n 13) section 3.2; Hartoft (n 69) section 4; Leviner (n 65) sections 2.2– 2.3; 
Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) section 4; Tolonen (n 67) section 2.3. See 
also the concluding observations of the crc Committee on Norway (n 40) Part iii para 
14; Iceland (n 40) Part iv paras 28– 29; and Denmark (n 64) Part iii para 13.
 76 Hartoft (n 69) section 4.1; Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) section 4. See 
also the concluding observations of the crc Committee on Denmark (n 64)  Part iii, 
para 13.
 77 Michael- Sebastian Honig, ‘Work and Care: Reconstructing Childhood through Childcare 
Policy in Germany’ In Allison James and Adrian L James (eds), European Childhoods: 
Cultures, Politics and Childhoods in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 198– 215, 202.
 78 Leviner (n 65) section 3.2.1 and the concluding observations of the crc Committee on 
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an expert to do so.79 The former method is preferable, as it ensures children 
superior voice.80 In recent years, systems have been put in place for child- 
inclusive decision- making processes on parental responsibility in mandatory 
out- of- court mediation.81 However, even when child- inclusive processes have 
been developed, they do not necessarily become the standard, as the Norwe-
gian bim model illustrates.82 When parents agree on residence and contact, 
children’s voices become muted unless the parents are willing to hear the 
views of the child and to incorporate those views in decision- making.83
The Nordic countries operate with numerous age- limits for participation in 
different areas of law, where 15 and 12 are very common. The approach appears 
to be haphazard because age- limits vary across different domains. While age 
limits ensure participation for children above the limit, they tend to hinder 
participation for younger children even when the provision states that suffi-
ciently mature children have participatory rights. Thus, age limits are a double- 
edged sword. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have high age limits, putting the 
limit mostly at 12 or 15 years of age.84 The Norwegian strategy is using two age 
limits, a lower limit ensuring the right to express views and a higher limit en-
suring that proper weight is assigned to those views. This approach is prefer-
able, because it forces authorities to hear children already at an earlier age.85 
Based on the contributions in this volume, time is not ripe for abolishing age 
limits; rather, the primary focus should be to lower them significantly. To avoid 
‘infantilisation’ of adolescents, we should simultaneously mind their capaci-
ties by endowing young people with stronger participatory rights than younger 
children.86
Children’s participatory rights depend to a large extent on practices:  on 
whether professionals involved in decision- making processes develop 
 79 Leviner (n 65) section 3.2.1; Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) sections 5.1.2 
and 5.2; Tolonen (n 67) section 3.
 80 crc Committee on Sweden (n 40) Part iii D.
 81 Gísladóttir (n 13)  section 5.3; Hartoft (n 69)  section 5; Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to 
Participate’ (n 44) section 5.1.1. For criticism on the practice in Denmark in place until 
March 2019, see the concluding observations of the crc Committee on Denmark (n 
64) Part iii, para 14.
 82 Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44)  section 5.1.1. See also the concluding 
observations of the crc Committee on Norway (n 40) Part iii para 14.
 83 Gísladóttir (n 13), section 5.2.
 84 Hartoft (n 69) section 5; Leviner (n 65) section 3.2.1; Tolonen (n 67) section 3.
 85 Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) section 6.
 86 Bruce Abramson, ‘The Invisibility of Children and Adolescents:  The Need to Monitor 
our Rhetoric and our Attitudes’ in Eugeen Verhellen (ed), Monitoring Children’s Rights 
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processes for involving children and hearing the voice of the child. Profession-
als need skills to engage children in age- appropriate ways. The contributions 
unanimously emphasise that formal participation does not guarantee voice 
and choice for children. It must be accompanied by appropriate child- friendly 
and child- centred practices and proper training of the professionals involved.87
Several authors address the difference between enabling children to express 
their views and giving due weight to those views. The two concepts do not ap-
pear to be highly problematized nationally, even though hearing the child does 
not automatically translate into giving weight to the views of the child.88 Per-
haps the two are largely thought to coincide – only children who are capable 
of ‘rational’ thinking are considered to be capable of forming their own views 
or perhaps the main problem is that children do not have access to meaningful 
participation, and consequently, the issue of assigning weight to those view 
does not arise. Icelandic and Norwegian law are the exception, operating with 
different age limits for the right to be heard, the right to participate in decision- 
making and the right to self- determination.89
5.3 The Role of Constitutional Protection
The question remains whether including children’s participatory rights in 
the Constitution matters. Despite the differences in the formal constitution-
al protection, the issues addressed in the five chapters on participation in 
this volume are similar. Divergences among the contributions seem to ensue 
primarily from each author’s research interest and is to some extent con-
tingent on incidental factors such as recent cases. As Hartoft notes, lack of 
constitutional protection (and lack of implementation of the crc at a semi- 
constitutional level) impedes reforms to some extent.90 Although the right to 
voice and choice is enshrined in the Finnish Constitution, case law from the 
ECtHR appear to be highly influential, perhaps much more so than case law 
from national courts, at least based on Tolonen’s contribution.91 The question 
is whether incorporating children’s rights into the Finnish Constitution has 
propelled the development of the right to participation or whether the shift 
emanates from the evolution in the role of human rights and changing atti-
tudes to children.
 87 Gísladóttir (n 13) sections 4 and 5; Hartoft (n 69) section 6; Leviner (n 65) section 3.2; 
Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) sections 5 and 7; Tolonen (n 67) section 4.
 88 Hartoft (n 69) section 6; Leviner (n 65) sections 3.2.2– 3.2.3 and 4.
 89 Gísladóttir (n 13) section 4.
 90 Hartoft (n 69) section 2.












Trude Haugli and Anna Nylund - 9789004382817
Downloaded from Brill.com02/24/2020 02:03:43PM
via University of Tromso
Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries 413
Although the value of explicitly including the right to participation as a con-
stitutional right is limited, Norwegian law has several examples of a burgeon-
ing shift in the patterns of argumentation.92 Children’s constitutional right to 
participation serves perhaps not by itself as a sufficient impetus for change of 
legislation and practices, but it adds significant weight to arguments for im-
proving participatory rights and to extend the reach of those rights. The com-
bined effect of the shift in our view of children and constitutional law could 
prove to be forceful.
6 The Right to Family Life
6.1 ‘Family’ as a Legal Concept
The family is almost universally considered as the natural environment for the 
child to live and grow. Although the right to family life has a bearing on virtu-
ally all areas of child law, as Schiratzki notes,93 and ‘family’ is a legal concept 
used in numerous international and national legal instruments, there is no 
common definition of ‘family’. If the concept is defined at all, it is presumably 
given divergent definitions in the various domains of law, e.g. in family law, 
child protection law and immigration law. Some guidance may be found by 
analysing echr article 8, which is incorporated into national law in all the 
Nordic countries.94 The ECtHR has developed the concept of and the right to 
family life over the years in its extensive practice, with increasing attention to 
the rights of the child and the crc. According to the ECtHR, family life may 
depend on biological, legal or social (de facto) ties between a child and anoth-
er person.95 The right to family life is understood both as a negative right that 
imposes a duty on the state not to interfere in family life and as a positive duty 
for the state to promote family life and to protect the family from violations 
from third parties. The Committee on the Rights of the Children interprets the 
concept of ‘family’ concordantly with the ECtHR when stating the following:
[t] he family is the fundamental unit of society and the natural environ-
ment for the growth and well- being of its members, particularly children 
 92 Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate’ (n 44) sections 5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3.
 93 Johanna Schiratzki, ‘Children’s Right to Family Life and the Swedish Constitution’ in 
Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries 
(Brill 2019)  chapter 18, section 1.
 94 See this chapter, section 3.
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(preamble of the Convention). The right of the child to family life is pro-
tected under the Convention (art 16). The term “family” must be inter-
preted in a broad sense to include biological, adoptive or foster parents 
or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community 
as provided for by local custom (art 5).96
According to the Norwegian Constitution, section 102, everyone has a right to 
respect for private and family life. ‘Everyone’ includes children, of course, and 
the provision should be read in conjunction with section 104. Section 71 of the 
Icelandic Constitution ensures the right to respect for private and family life. 
Family is not mentioned in the Finnish Constitution, however, the right to pri-
vacy as stated in section 10 is meant to cover family life as well. According to 
 chapter 1, section 2 of the Swedish Instrument of Government, the State has a 
duty to protect the private and family life of the individual. Family is not men-
tioned in the Danish Constitution, however, the right to personal liberty is pro-
tected under section 71, and interference with family life may be considered as 
an intervention in the right to personal liberty.
To identify how children’s right to family life has been implemented, one 
must turn to statutory law and court cases. In analysing children’s right to 
family life, the authors in this volume have mainly discussed children’s rights 
to know and to be cared for by their parents, which includes registration of 
paternity, parental responsibility and the post- divorce family; adoption; out 
of home care; and forming and maintaining relationships with the extended 
family. Based on the four chapters on family life in this volume, the variations 
among the Nordic countries regarding children’s rights to family life are fairly 
small. Therefore, the areas with the most pronounced differences will be sub-
ject to further analysis.
6.2 Defining and Establishing Parenthood
The idea of parenthood in Nordic legislation appears to stem tacitly from the 
idea of the nuclear family with two parents of opposite sexes, even when the 
parents are separated, divorced or have never lived together. However, the reg-
ulation of parenthood is far from consistent. Despite recurrent debates of ex-
tending parenthood to more than two persons when more than two persons 
are the de facto parents of the child, no legislative changes have been made. 
 96 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment no. 14 (2013) on the right of the 
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Thera are naturally many children with only one parent, and in Norway and 
Sweden single persons are allowed to adopt children. In Sweden, assisted re-
production is legal for single women, in Norway they are limited to married 
and co- habiting couples.
Regarding the right to contest and change legal paternity, the views differ – 
and evolve – in the Nordic countries. The main concern is balancing ‘the right 
to know’ and the protection of the family that has been established de facto. 
The right to know one’s identity is an integral part of the right to privacy and 
family life, stated the Supreme Court of Iceland in a paternity suit.97 In Norway, 
the Children Act has been amended several times in this respect. Currently the 
child, either of the parents and any person who believes he is the father of a 
child, may at any time bring an action before the courts regarding paternity, 
even when paternity has already been established through marriage or decla-
ration. Denmark, on the other hand, has very strict reopening rules. The ECtHR 
has accepted these rules under the condition that there is still room for some 
discretion.98 Thus, Norway protects the right to know and biological factors, 
whereas Denmark protects the family as an established social unit. Finland is 
in a middle position: Since 2015, the time limits for the child to bring a pater-
nity case to court have been abolished as a consequence of a ruling of the Su-
preme Court from 2012 finding such time limits unconstitutional.99 However, 
a time limit still restricts the right of the legal mother and father to bring an 
action on paternity.100
Legislation reflects how particularly assisted reproductive treatments result 
in the increasing importance of intent as a factor for establishing parenthood, 
observes Koulu.101 Still, the Icelandic Supreme Court found that the refusal to 
acknowledge non- biological intended parents as legal parents pursuant to a 
surrogacy arrangement did not amount to a violation of the right to family 
life.102
 97 Friðriksdóttir (n 5) section 3.
 98 Caroline Adolphsen, ‘Children’s Right to Family Life in Denmark’ in Trude Haugli and oth-
ers (eds), Children’s Constitutional Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 19, 
section 2.2.
 99 Sanna Koulu, ‘Children’s Right to Family Life in Finland: A Constitutional Right or a Side 
Effect of the “Normal Family”?’ in Trude Haugli and others (eds), Children’s Constitutional 
Rights in the Nordic Countries (Brill 2019)  chapter 17, section 4.1.
 100 Koulu (n 99) section 4.1.
 101 Koulu (n 99) section 4.1.
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6.3 The Right to Family Life for Children in Out- of- Home Care and in  
Post- Divorce Families
The ECtHR has repeatedly stated that ‘the mutual enjoyment by parent and 
child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life 
and that domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interfer-
ence with the right protected by Article 8’.103
A fundamental part of this ‘mutual enjoyment’ is the right to live together, 
enable ‘normal’ development of family relationships, or at least to enable reg-
ular contact between the child and parent(s). As Koulu notes, ‘the child’s right 
to family life does not suddenly disappear just because her right to protection 
and her best interest need to take precedence at a given moment’.104
The right of the child to maintain contact with the biological family other 
than the parents (i.e. siblings and grandparents), or the de facto family, or both 
(i.e. step- or social- siblings or parents), is very limited in post- divorce cases in 
the Nordic countries, which reflects the dominance of the two- parent norm 
in all the Nordic countries, and how family is construed narrowly to encom-
pass child- parent relations only. However, the 2018 reform of the Finnish Child 
Custody Act constitutes a shift in extending family life to include for example 
step- parents and grand- parents as persons with whom an enforceable right to 
contact can be established.105
For children in out- of- home care, the general picture is slightly different. 
In Norway and Finland, the social welfare authorities have a duty to investi-
gate whether children can live with their non- residential parent or be placed 
in foster care within the extended family. In Finland, the variations in social 
family constellations are recognises by giving children placed in care the right 
to meet their parents, siblings and ‘other people close to them’.106 Similarly, in 
Denmark, children in care have the right to stay in contact with their social 
network.107 In Sweden and Norway, the child’s right to contact with the ex-
tended family is more restricted. This might amount to a violation of children’s 
right to respect for their family life, according to echr article 8, and, in Nor-
way, in conflict with the Constitution sections 102 and 104. For children living 
in a foster home, the foster- family may over time turn into the child’s de facto 
family, especially in cases where contact between the child and the biological 
family has been very limited.
 103 Johansen v Norway App no 7383/ 90 (ECtHR, 7 August 1996).
 104 Koulu (n 99) section 1.
 105 Koulu (n 99) section 4.2.
 106 Koulu (n 99) section 4.3.
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During the last few years Norwegian child protection cases have been heav-
ily criticized by an international audience, mainly for not paying sufficient re-
spect to family life. Since 2016, the ECtHR has received 13 complaints against 
Norway in such cases.108 The main questions concern care orders, contact and 
adoption. Norwegian courts should give proper attention and weight to chil-
dren’s rights to respect for their family life, balancing the principle of the best 
interests of the child, as Bendiksen notes.109
In Norway, Denmark and Finland children placed in care may in extraor-
dinary circumstances be adopted without the consent of the parents.110 In 
Sweden, custody may be transferred to the child’s foster parents, and this is 
regarded as the Swedish version of adoption of a child without consent from 
the birth parents.111 Adoption transfers the child’s right to family life to concern 
the adoptive family and terminates the legal ties to the birth family.
6.4 An Emerging Shift in the Nordic Definition of Family Life?
Nordic family life has changed significantly over the past decades, but these 
changes are not sufficiently reflected in the legal regulation of family life and 
parenthood. Cohabitation is legally largely equated marriage and same sex re-
lations are legally recognized. Many children live in post- divorce families and 
experience that their parents establish new relationships. Children’s family re-
lationships have become more diverse, complex and fluid. Regulating the right 
of the child to family life with the extended or de facto family in different areas 
is one challenge.
If family is defined in a too narrow way, law may put restrictions on a child’s 
right to contact with people close to them. This may represent a violation of 
the right to respect for family life and the best interest of the child. There must 
 108 Ten cases have been communicated from the emd since 2016. K.O. and V.M. v Norway App 
no 64808/ 16; Hernehult v Norway App no 14652/ 16; Ibrahim v Norway App no 15379/ 
16; Pedersen and others v Norway App no 39710/ 15; Hasan v Norway App no 27496/ 15; 
M.L. v Norway App no 43701/ 14; A.S v Norway App no 60371/ 15; Strand Lobben and oth-
ers v Norway App no 37283/ 13; Jansen v Norway App no 2822/ 16 Bodnariu and others v 
Norway App no 73890/ 16.Three cases have been lawfully settled; there was a violation 
in one of the cases (Jansen v Norway) and Norway was acquitted in the other two (M.L 
v Norway, M.H. v Norway). In addition, the case of Strand Lobben and Others v Norway, 
where Norway was acquitted—however, with a dissenting opinion—was brought before 
the emd’s Grand Chamber in 2018. The decision is not yet final. Another three complaints 
against Norway have been rejected with justification, without being communicated.
 109 Bendiksen (n 44) section 6.
 110 Bendiksen (n 44)  section 6; Koulu (n 99)  section 4.1; Adolphsen, ‘Children’s Right to 
Family Life’ (n 98) section 4.2.
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be room for discretion, as a child may have lived with a person for a long time 
without establishing any emotional connection with the person or contrary, 
have developed a close emotional connection during a short period of time.
Fathers spend much more time with their children and in many families the 
parents participate in taking care of children equally. This is a consequence of 
Nordic women’s high participation in working life outside of home. For sepa-
rated or divorced parents, shared parental responsibility has, in practice, be-
come the main rule. One sees a clear trend towards increased shared residence 
for children.
How parenthood can be established has also changed considerably, with ge-
netics and intention as new factors in the context of increased possibilities for 
various forms of assisted reproduction. Co- motherhood is a new legal concept, 
linked to the fact that the mother’s female partner establishes parenthood 
through consent to assisted reproduction. Children can be created through 
surrogacy schemes, which in themselves raise a number of unresolved legal 
challenges both nationally and internationally, including the issues of how the 
intention to become a parent should be protected legally, and which obliga-
tions towards the future child the intention should entail.
One challenge is the balancing of children’s right to know about their genet-
ic origin, with the child’s right to be cared for by the persons legally recognised 
as a child’s parents.
The Nordic countries are trying to cope with these challenges, often by fre-
quently changing statutory law, piece by piece. Children’s rights to respect for 
their family life are heavily protected by constitutional law and human rights 
conventions, but this does not suffice. Those rights must be comprehensively 
implemented in national law. However, the task is far from easy: ‘It takes care-
ful legal craftsmanship to create a comprehensive legal system that meets the 
demands of protecting and promoting those relationships that make up con-
temporary family life’, comments Schiratzki.112
7 The Value of Specific Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights
The initial assessment done in section 2.5 above suggests that constitutional 
protection could render tools for advocating that courts, policy makers and 
practitioners must take children’s rights seriously. According to Conor O’Ma-
hony, making children visible in constitutional matters ‘requires child- specific 
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provisions rather than leaving children to rely on general rights guarantees’.113 
The question is whether the varying level of constitutional protection is re-
flected in legislation, court cases and (legal) practices. Another question is 
whether codifying children’s rights in the Constitution represents the culmina-
tion of the development of recognition of children’s rights and or the genesis 
of a new era?
Answering these questions is far from easy, as this study demonstrates. At 
first glance, the differences among the Nordic countries in terms of recogni-
tion and implementation of children’s rights are practically non- existent and 
stem from differences in reform cycles, structural and organisational differenc-
es and so forth, rather than from divergent views on children’s capabilities and 
rights. However, this observation would support the view that children’s con-
stitutional rights are of little consequence and that constitutionalisation is the 
apex of the shift in our image of children.
However, a more detailed analysis defeats, at least partly, this line of argu-
mentation. Constitutional rights are an advocacy tool in several respects, as 
numerous examples from primarily Norway and Finland. These two countries 
afford a stronger – more comprehensive and obliging – constitutional protec-
tion of children’s rights. The Constitution demands that children’s rights are 
taken seriously in the legislative process, especially when the act of parliament 
or decree is of vital importance for children. The legislator must assess wheth-
er and how each provision impacts children’s rights. There are indications that 
when a right is explicitly enshrined in the Constitution, the legislator will make 
a more thorough assessment of that right when drafting new laws. Constitu-
tional rights influence interpretation of statutory law, as well. Again, the more 
clearly a right is protected in the Constitution, the stronger the persuasive 
force of it will be, and courts and administrative organs will be more likely to 
interpret law in light of it and, thus, enforce it. In light of these observations, 
constitutional rights matter, even in countries where children’s rights are wide-
ly recognised and even treated as principles of law.
Norway and Finland, by recognising children as rights- holders in their 
Constitutions, also illustrate the innate transformative power of constitution-
alisation of children’s rights. Constitutionalisation propels implementation 
and enforcement of children’s rights by mandating policy- makers, legislators, 
courts and practitioners working with children and children’s rights to take 
those rights seriously. The more unequivocal and comprehensively children’s 
rights are enshrined, and the more children’s human dignity is advocated, the 
 113 O’Mahony (n 1). 
 
Trude Haugli and Anna Nylund - 9789004382817
Downloaded from Brill.com02/24/2020 02:03:43PM
via University of Tromso
420 Haugli and Nylund
more efficient advocacy tools the Constitution offers. Based on our study, a 
dedicated provision for children’s rights, recognising children as agents and 
containing at least all the general principles of the crc, is superior to other 
alternatives.
Despite the value of constitutional law, constitutionalisation is not a mag-
ic trick transforming law overnight. On the contrary, implementation is a 
slow and arduous process, requiring continuous effort. Firstly, constitutions 
are inherently general, requiring interpretation and in need of implemen-
tation through more detailed provisions in legislation, practice guidelines, 
policy documents and other documents. Courts must be willing to interpret 
and enforce the Constitution in a manner that empowers children, balanc-
ing considerations of agency and vulnerability. This volume contains abun-
dant examples of how children’s rights are implemented, interpreted and 
enforced unevenly in different realms, and how current legislation and prac-
tices are oftentimes unsatisfactory. Adult- centric notions produce resistance 
towards development of child- centred practices and regulation. In many 
areas, policies, practices and the mind- set of individuals working with chil-
dren are pivotal for implementing children’s rights in practice. Allocation of 
adequate resources to develop and implement new practices and to provide 
necessary training and monitoring is required if we want to take children’s 
rights  seriously.
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